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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have inspired many applications such as military applications, environmental 
monitoring and other fields. WSN has emergence in various fields, so security is very important issue for sensor 
networks. Security comes from attacks. Due to the wireless and distributed nature anyone can connect with the 
network. Among all possible attacks, wormholes are very hard to detect because they can cause damage to the 
network without knowing the protocols used in the network. It is a powerful attack that can be conducted 
without requiring any cryptographic breaks. Wormholes are hard to detect because they use a private, out-of-
band channel invisible to the underlying sensor network. In this paper we have proposed a wormhole detection 
protocol based on neighborhood and connectivity information. Performance analysis shows that our proposed 
approach can effectively detect wormhole attack with less storage cost. 
Keywords: Wireless sensor network, wormhole, out-of-band, security, neighborhood.  
 
1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor network consists of hundreds or thousands of tiny sensor nodes. The sensor nodes can sense, 
process and communicate with their neighbor nodes [1]. The low power sensor nodes can collectively monitor a 
particular area [2]. One sensor node sends data to the next node and finally data reaches to the base station. A 
base station can be a powerful data processing center. Sensor nodes can be used for continuous sensing, event 
detection and event identification.  The application of wireless sensor networks includes military, environment, 
health, home, commercial, space exploration, chemical processing and disaster relief etc [3, 4]. 
Security is very crucial factor for sensor network that deserves great attention. Wireless sensor 
networks are vulnerable to malicious attacks due to their fundamental characteristic such as open medium, 
dynamic topology and resource constraints [5, 6]. WSNs could be attacked at all levels. The survey by Karlof 
and Wagner [7] classifies a number of attacks that prove devastating to many fundamental WSN routing 
protocols. Major attacks on sensor networks include blackhole, selective forwarding, Sybil, wormhole, jamming 
etc. Among all the attacks wormhole attack is very dangerous.  
In a wormhole attack, two malicious nodes are connected by a high-speed tunnel and they both are far 
away from each other [8-11]. One malicious node records the packets in one area, forward to another malicious 
node and the second malicious node replay the packets in the different location. This generates a false scenario 
that the original sender is in the neighborhood of the remote location. The tunneling procedure forms a 
wormhole. This might be harmful if the data within the packet is altered to contain different information than the 
original. Due to the fast transmission path between the two ends of the wormhole, the tunneled packets can 
propagate faster than those through a normal multi-hop route. Wormholes fake a route that is shorter than the 
original one within the network; this can confuse routing mechanisms which rely on the knowledge about 
distance between nodes.  
In this paper, we present a wormhole detection mechanism based on neighborhood and connectivity 
information in wireless sensor networks. It uses a secure pre-distribution pair-wise key management protocol. 
Our proposed protocol consists of three phases: In the first phase, every node builds its one hop neighborhood 
table. In the second phase, the neighbor table is exchanged to forms two hop neighborhood list. Third phase 
includes the wormhole detection procedure. The proposed protocol is applicable to resource constraints wireless 
sensor networks. It does not require any hardware such as time synchronized clock or directional antenna. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents significance of wormhole and 
wormhole attack taxonomy, whereas in Section 3, we discuss various existing methods to detect wormhole 
attack. Section 4 provides detail description of our proposed approach. Cost analysis and simulation results are 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 6. 
 
2. Wormhole Attack Description 
2.1 Significance of Wormhole Attack 
A shortcut delivered by a malicious node will harm the normal network operations. The data packets received by 
one malicious node are transferred to another malicious node which is located far away. This transmission is 
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done through an out-of-band high speed channel.  Such a simple operation can severely affect the localization 
and routing procedures. 
 
Fig. 2.1 Wormhole Attack 
As shown in fig. 2.1, two malicious nodes M1 and M2 makes a tunnel. Node M1 attracts traffic from 
one area and passes it to node M2 in other area. The malicious nodes and the link between them are hidden from 
the genuine nodes. They do not hold any valid network Ids. To launch the attack, there is no need to compromise 
the network node. Using tunneling an attacker can creates a false scenario. In the presence of wormhole, target 
tracking applications can be easily confused. The localization algorithms based on connectivity are also affected 
by wormhole attack. Detection of wormhole attack is hard because the malicious entities make it “invisible” to 
the upper layers [12, 13]. Wormhole attack can be launched at the bit level or at the physical layer [14]. After 
establishing wormhole, the attackers can perform various types of attacks, such as the black hole attacks or 
selective forwarding attacks. 
 
2.2 Wormhole Attack Taxonomy 
Wormhole attacks can be launched using several different techniques [15, 16] mentioned as follow: 
2.2.1 Wormhole using Encapsulation 
 
Fig.2.2 Wormhole through packet encapsulation 
In between two malicious nodes, the actual hop counts do not increase.  As shown in fig. 2.2, source 
node S try to discover the shortest path to the destination node D. Node S broadcasts a route request (RREQ), 
malicious node M1 gets the RREQ and encapsulates it in a packet routed to M2. Malicious node M2 replies it to 
destination node D. Because the packet is encapsulated, the actual hop count does not increase between 
malicious node M1 and malicious node M2. The RREQ also travels from source node S to destination node D 
through A – B – C. Destination  D  has two  routes, one is four hops long ( S-A-B-C-D), and the another is three 
hops long (S-M1-M2-D). In reality the second route is seven hops long, but it appears the shortest route, so 
destination node D will selects the second route. 
2.2.2 Wormhole using Out-of-Band Channel  
 
Fig.2.3 Wormhole through out-of-band channel 
Two malicious nodes create high bandwidth out of band tunnel to launch the wormhole attack. The 
tunnel can be establish through wired or wireless link. As shown in fig. 2.3, nodes M1 and M2 are malicious 
nodes and having an out of band channel between them. Source node S is sending a route request to destination 
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node D. Node M1 tunnels the route request to M2 and M2 broadcasts it to destination node D.  Destination node 
D receives two route request packets – S-M1-M2-D and S-W-X-Y-Z-D. The first route is faster and shorter than 
the second, so the destination node D chooses the first route. 
2.2.3 Wormhole with High Power Transmission 
A route request packet received by a malicious node having high power transmission capability is broadcasted 
from a long distance. When the node hears the broadcast request with high power, it rebroadcasts it to the 
destination. In this way, the chances of malicious node increases to be in the path establishment between source 
and destination.  
2.2.4 Wormhole using Packet Relay 
One malicious node relays packets between two far away nodes to convince them that they are neighbors. As 
shown in fig. 2.4, node S and D are not neighbor nodes. They are connected through a malicious node M1.  
Malicious node M1 relays packets between node S and node D so both nodes believe that they are neighbors.  
 
Fig. 2.4 Attack using packet relay with one malicious node. 
 
3. Related Work 
Wormhole attack detection has been a hot research topic during the last decade and lots of schemes have been 
proposed.  Most of the existing schemes proposed in the literature require additional hardware or software or 
calculation of round trip time.  
 
3.1 Distance-bounding/Consistency-based Approaches 
In [12, 13] author has proposed packet leash approach. In geographical leash, when a node sends 
a packet, it adds its transmission time and its location. After receiving the packet, the receiving node computes 
the distance to the sender. Temporal leash approach requires tight clock synchronization. The transmission 
distance of a packet is calculated as the product of signal propagation time and the speed of light. In [17] the 
author has proposed secure localization method using received signal strength indicator. Challenge-response 
delay measurement technique is proposed in [18]. Using the measured times, the sender and receiver node 
estimate an upper bound on their distance. Timing based measurement approach is presented in [19] to validate 
the neighbors. In the ranging based approach [20] every node calculates its distance from all of its neighbors for 
link verification. In [21] using hop counting technique local map will be computed and if the diameter of the 
computed local map will be larger than the physical one, it indicates the presence of the wormhole. The 
approaches presented in [22, 23, 24] are all based on round trip time.  
 
3.2 Secure Neighbor Discovery Approaches 
In [25] every node sends reports wait for an acknowledgement. If node does not receive the ACK message, the 
next node is wormhole node. The ACK messages must be transmitted via different path than the original report 
is sent on and transmitted between nodes separated by two hops. In [26] using statistical analysis of multipath 
routing and based on the percentage of ACKs received, the destination will verify the presence of the wormhole 
attack. In [27] every node is equipped with a special hardware: directional antenna. Directional antenna is used 
to get approximate direction based on received signals. In [28], the observer nodes monitor traffic in the sensor 
network and generate digital evidences. It tries to detect the nodes that are not forwarding the datagram. 
 
3.3 Connectivity-based Approaches 
In [29] to detect wormhole attack the network connectivity is examined. The malicious node can not cooperate 
with the local connectivity test or it report incorrect connectivity information. In [30] if the size of the maximal 
independent set is equal or larger than forbidden parameter, node x identifies that there is a wormhole attack in 
the network. Due to the wormhole, the one hop neighbors of a node will increase and the node degree is used to 
detect wormhole [31]. In [32] the idea behind neighbor number test is that the number of neighbors of the 
malicious node is increased by creating fake links and the idea behind all distance tests is that due to the 
wormhole the path becomes shorter in the network. In [33] the wormhole is located by finding the fundamental 
topology deviations and tracing the sources. For visualization based approach [34], if there is a presence of 
wormhole, the shape of the network layout will have some bent or distorted features. By visualizing the graph, 
the wormhole attack is detected. In [35] the idea is to find alternate shortest path between sender and receiver 
and count the no. of hops to detect the wormhole attack. 
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3.4 Localization-based Approaches 
The author has presented a graph theoretic framework for modeling wormhole links in [36].The mobile beacon 
moves in the networks to communicate with the static beacons [37]. For a request message, if mobile beacon 
receives a reply message from a static beacon more than once then it can determine there is a wormhole attack in 
its transmission range. In [38] the author has proposed the concept of location based keys that can act as efficient 
countermeasures against wormhole attack. In [39], communication keys to prevent wormhole attacks are 
efficiently distributed to sensor nodes. Sensor nodes located beyond the communication ranges do not share a 
communication key. The scheme presented in [41] is an improvement over the scheme presented in [40] by 
utilizing antenna rotations and multiple transmit power levels. 
 
4. Proposed Method  
4.1 System Model and Assumptions 
Wireless sensor network consists of n sensor nodes. In wireless sensor network, two sensor nodes are considered 
neighbors if the distance between them is within the transmission range r. We assume that the sensor nodes are 
static. The sensor nodes uses broadcast communication primitive. When sensor nodes are deployed, all nodes are 
legitimate nodes and no malicious nodes are present. Initially during some interval there are no malicious nodes 
present in the network and nodes safely found their neighbor information. 
Once deployed immediately the nodes form their neighborhood table. We assume that the ranges 
(wormhole radius) of receiving and the sending of both wormhole transceivers are the same. Proposed scheme 
requires a pre-distribution pair-wise key management protocol as in [42]. 
 
4.2 Adversary Model 
We assume that a malicious entity can launch many kinds of wormhole attacks. It is able to launch high-speed 
low-latency tunnel. One malicious node records packets at one location and replays them to second malicious 
node at the location which is far away through out of band tunnel. The malicious node drop packets without 
forwarding them to the next node. In such situation, base station is not able to receive any information from the 
target area. The malicious entity can also modify the data packets. 
  
4.3 Defense Algorithm 
Proposed protocol consists of three phases: In the first phase, every node builds its one hop neighborhood table. 
In the second phase, the neighbor table is exchanged to forms two hop neighborhood list. Third phase includes 
the wormhole detection procedure. 
(1) Build one-hop neighborhood list. 
After deployment, each node sends a hello message to its neighbors. The node who receives the hello message 
sends reply back. A shared key is used to authenticate this reply. After verifying the authenticity, the sender node 
adds the receiving node to its neighbor list. Every node performs the same procedure to build one hop 
neighborhood list. 
(2) Build two-hop neighborhood list. 
To build two hop neighbor lists, each node exchanges its neighbor list to its neighbors. Every node broadcast 
message that contains its own neighbor list. It is authenticated individually by the shared key. When receiving 
node hears the broadcast request, it first verifies the authenticity of neighbor list of sender node and stores it if 
verified correctly. At last, each node has a table of its neighbor list and its neighbors’ neighbor list.  
(3) Wormhole detection procedure. 
At some point of time, node x overhears packets from some new nodes, say node y. Node y is a suspected node. 
The neighbor list consists of two parts: trusted and suspected. Node y is added into suspected part. There might 
be a wormhole attack or not. For every suspected node added in the neighbor list, the following steps are 
performed:  
Step 1: Node x verifies that whether node x and node y share any one hop common neighbor. Two fake neighbor 
nodes can not share a common one hop neighbor node. Two genuine neighbor nodes generally share a common 
one hop neighbor node among them.  If found then go to step (4), otherwise go to the next step. 
Step 2: Node x verifies that any neighbors of x is directly connected to any neighbors of node y. Node x visits all 
its neighbor’s neighbor table to verify that if any of y's neighbors is present. If found then go to step (4), 
otherwise go to the next step. 
Step 3: Node x tells its trusted neighbors to find the shortest path to suspected node y which can not be direct and 
it avoids the one hop neighbors of node x. It does not include the path from node x to y. If the reported path 
length is less than predefined threshold, then go to next step otherwise go to step (6). 
Step 4: Delete node y from suspicious entry and add it to the list of trusted entry. The link x->y is declared as 
safe link.  No wormhole attack presence in the network. 
Step 5: Stop. 
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Step 6: The link x->y is declared as fake link and wormhole attack is detected. 
Step 7: Stop the communication with two far away located nodes. 
Step 8: Stop. 
The algorithm for detection procedure is as follow: 
Result: To identify whether new node is genuine neighbor or not. 
Input: x and y, where y is a suspected neighbor of node x and 2-hop neighbor information of node x. 
Output: The link x->y is declared as safe link or fake link. 
 
BOOL Detection(x, y, Suspects(x)) 
Begin 
      For each node yi in Suspected_Part(x) do 
             if ( Nx ∩ Ny ≠ Φ )  
                then 
                   return FALSE;                     
                   Add y to the list of trusted neighbors; 
            end 
            if (2hop-Nx ∩ Ny ≠ Φ)   
                then 
                   return FALSE;                     
                   Add y to the list of trusted neighbors; 
            end 
                  for each y Ԑ Suspected_Part 
every xi Ԑ Nx, xi finds routes from  xi  to suspected node y where Nx is not subset  of the route 
and the path from xi to y is not direct; 
                        every xi Ԑ Nx, xi sends  | Rxi-y| to x. 
           if any |Rxi-y| <=threshold  
               then  
              return FALSE; 
              Add y to the list of trusted neighbors; 
          end; 
 return TRUE; 
Remove y from the list of neighbors;     
end; 
end;    
 
5. Performance Analysis and Simulation Results 
5.1 Storage Cost Analysis 
The average number of neighbors is represented by NA. The total number of nodes is represented by NT. The size 
of ID is represented by SID.  The key size is represented by SK. To store the neighbor list the storage cost 
required is SIDNA. To store a shared key with its neighbors the storage cost required is SKNA. To store the 
neighbors’ neighbor list the storage cost required is SIDNANA. Therefore, the total storage cost for each node is 
{SIDNA + SKNA + SIDNANA}. If SID is 4 bytes, SK is 8 bytes, and NA is 10, then the storage cost for each node is 
520 bytes. The sensor node has 4 kB of RAM and 512 kB of flash memory in wireless sensor network [43]. 
Proposed approach is suitable for wireless sensor network because it uses very less memory. The total storage 
cost in the network is {SID  * NA +  SK * NA + SID * NA *NA} * NT.  
 
5.2 Simulation Results 
For simulation we have used NS2. Packet delivery ratio and throughput both decrease after creating the attack. 
After applying proposed algorithm, it is nearer to its original value. The detection rate is the ratio of the number 
of attacked links detected to the total number of attacked links. The detection rate increases as the tunnel length 
increases. The proposed algorithm has 95% detection accuracy. The threshold value used is 3. False positive are 
totally reduced. False negative occurs when wormhole launched for short distance. 
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Fig. 5.1 Packet Delivery Ratio                                                                                            Fig. 5.2 Throughput 
 
6. Conclusion 
Wormhole attack is very dangerous to wireless sensor networks. Detecting it is very hard because it disturbs 
routing without any cryptographic break. Our proposed method can effectively detect wormhole attack in 
wireless sensor networks. Performance analysis shows that it has good storage cost and it is applicable to 
resource constrained wireless sensor networks. In future we will develop wormhole detection method for 
dynamic sensor networks. 
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